I Introduction
In the 1990s the term globalisation has become the expression en vogue to describe the increasing integration of national economies through cross-border transactions.
Integration usually refers to the international trade of goods and services, to private cross-border capital flows, and to the worldwide exchange of knowledge or information 1 . The accelerated globalisation in the 1990s has initiated an intensive debate on its impact on economic growth and poverty reduction in developing countries. The following discussion focuses exclusively on integration through trade.
The role of capital market integration and the increasing exchange of information and knowledge, hardly separable from trade integration, are not explicitly considered.
Most economists hold the opinion that reducing barriers to economic integration have a positive effect on economic growth and poverty reduction. This view is often termed the "openness hypothesis", which interprets liberal regimes of international transactions as a major cause of higher rates of economic growth and poverty reduction. As the struggle for reducing trade restrictions under the umbrella of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) illustrates, the presumed role of free trade is the most controversial issue. During the last decades, many developing countries have followed a strategy of import substituting industrialisation (ISI) with high trade barriers. Proponents of the openness school of thought see the reluctance to reduce tariff and non-tariff trade barriers in these economies as a major impediment to economic growth and poverty reduction.
Not all economists share this view. Instead of "closed-economy pathology" some economists diagnose "corruption pathology" as the major cause of slow growth and persistent poverty. Corruption pathology refers to deficient or weakly enforced nonmarket institutions. The protection of property rights, the enforcement of rule of law, a "clean" (non-corrupt) bureaucracy, and democratic checks and balances are well known examples of institutional settings that are weak in many developing countries.
Political leaders use such weak institutions to enrich themselves and their cronies. In the long run corruption and rent-seeking behaviour becomes a negative-sum process, which acts as a drag on economic growth. Proponents of the institutional hypothesis argue that well-defined and enforced institutions are major determinants of growth and poverty reduction, which subsequently leads to liberalisation of international transactions. Therefore institutional reforms are recommended, while trade policy is not high on the reform agenda.
The two hypotheses have been tested in several recent papers using cross-national data 2
. On the one hand Sachs and Warner (1995) , Edwards (1998) , Frankel and Romer (1999) , and Dollar and Kraay (2001a , 2001b conclude that trade policy and openness are important determinants of economic growth. On the other hand Knack and Keefer (1995) , Rodrik (1998) , Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) , Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) , and Easterly and Levine (2002) come to the conclusion that the quality of institutions is an outstanding determinant of growth and "trumps" openness (and "geography", a conclusion contradicted by Sachs 2003) .
The paper at hand focuses mainly on the impact of openness and trade policy on economic growth in the medium run. Most of the studies quoted above have a slightly different focus and will therefore not be discussed in detail. The papers of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) , Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) , and Easterly and Levine (2002) use the level of per capita income as the dependent variable. In other words, they have a very long run perspective. Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) argue correctly that policy variables should not be used to explain the level of income. Policies are a sort of flow variables that affect income growth. As policies are not observed in the very long run they simply cannot be used to explain income levels.
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The studies of Edwards (1998), Frankel and Romer (1999) , and Dollar and Kraay (2001a , 2001b concentrate on testing the impact of globalisation on economic growth. Globalisation is measured as the trade share (exports plus imports divided by the gross domestic product).
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However, although the authors recommend liberal trade policy, they do not test the impact of policies (via globalisation) on growth. That is a disadvantage in the sense that not only trade policy but also other policies and institutions may affect globalisation. Hence, the effect of trade policy on growth, which is at the heart of the debate between the openness school of thought and the institutional school of thought, is all but clear.
The following discussion therefore starts with the papers of Sachs and Warner (1995) , proponents of the openness hypothesis, and Rodrik (1998) , the probably most outspoken critic of the openness school of thought and proponent of the institutional hypothesis. The main goal of this discussion is to show that the two seemingly antagonistic points of view do not necessarily exclude each other. It is argued that empirical tests of the two models discussed suffer from conceptual weaknesses, that they possibly tell the same story from different angles, and that the two pathologies mentioned before may have a common root. The paper is structured as follows. Section II explains the theoretical position of the openness school of thought and the pros and cons of the empirical evidence found by Sachs and Warner. Section III discusses the alternative growth explanation proposed by the institutional school of thought, based on a model of Rodrik (1998) . Section IV illustrates that protective trade policies and weak institutions correlate, and that Rodrik's model specification can be reformulated to support the openness hypothesis. Section V contains conclusions.
II

Openness and economic growth
The concept of openness suggests that economies benefit from international trade, international capital transactions, and the international exchange of knowledge and information. The lower the barriers to international transactions, the higher the level of integration and the benefits. With respect to cross-border flows of capital and knowledge the causal link is easy to understand. Inflows of foreign capital and knowledge add to scarce factors of production, which support economic growth.
Regarding trade, the openness argument is based on two theoretical pillars: classical (Romer 1986 ).
According to new trade theory the impact of openness on growth works through different channels (Irwin 2002) . In an open economy enterprises face competition and have larger markets, which brings down prices and costs through market-enforced discipline and economies of scale. Trade and contact with foreign enterprises provide access to knowledge of new product and production styles, either through technology embodied in imports or through foreign direct investment.
Countries that follow an ISI strategy suffer not only from losing static and dynamic benefits by neglecting the principle of comparative advantage. High trade restrictions tend to produce exchange rate appreciations and inflation in the non-tradable sector.
As a consequence, producers of tradable goods and services are discriminated and economies become more vulnerable to external shocks. Erroneous fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies may amplify these effects. In addition, trade protection creates interest groups that lobby for maintaining and extending these and similar government interventions (Hirschman 1968 
Critical discussion
The Sachs-Warner study has two weaknesses. First, the binary representation of openness is not satisfying. The very idea of openness suggests gradual differences over time and between countries, and therefore a continuous index would be The term "agnostic" is a rather euphemistic description of Rodrik's sanguine view of ISI policies. In several papers (Rodrik 1997 (Rodrik , 1998 (Rodrik , 2001 ) he expresses the view that "ISI worked rather well for a period of about two decades" (Rodrik 1997, p. 2) , and in Haussman and Rodrik (2002) he calls for an industrial policy that comes close to a renaissance of ISI. Put differently, Rodrik thinks that critics of ISI, who blame trade barriers as a major cause of the deplorable growth performance of many developing countries since the second half of the 1970s, got the whole story wrong:
"The bottom line is that in those countries that experienced a debt crisis, the crisis was the product of monetary and fiscal policies that were incompatible with sustainable external balances: there was too little expenditure reducing and expenditure switching. Trade and industrial policies had very little to do with bringing on the crisis" (Rodrik 2001b, p. 18) .
III Institutions and economic growth
The institutional school of thought suggests that the quality of institutions determines growth performance not only in the long run but also in the medium run. To a large extent this contention gained momentum after many developing countries had accomplished considerable macroeconomic and structural reforms during the 1980s, which often failed to fully achieve expected outcomes. Progress in income growth and poverty reduction was in many countries rather limited. Today it is understood that, apart from macroeconomic stability and functioning markets, the "rules of the game" play an important role (North 1990 (North , 1994 . That raised the question whether the policy reforms of the 1980s actually addressed the most important issues, among other things trade liberalisation, and the "second wave" of reforms has a strong focus on improving the quality of institutions.
The Rodrik study
Rodrik's alternative explanation of the economic crisis and low growth rates after the mid 1970s concentrates on three determinants: external shocks, latent social conflicts, and institutions of conflict management.
"Heuristically, the core idea ... can be summarized by the following formula:
In words, the effect of shocks on growth is larger the greater the latent social conflicts in an economy and the weaker its institutions of conflict management." (Rodrik 1998, p. 2; August 1998 version of the paper on Rodrik's homepage). "The results of this paper indicate that participatory and democratic institutions, the rule of law, and social insurance are all components of a strategy to enhance resilience to volatility in the external environment" (Rodrik, 1998, p 28 ).
In "Income inequality, democracy, institutional quality, and a composite measure of social conflict all turn out to be strongly correlated with "bad policy". Countries with greater inequality and social conflict were significantly worse at managing the macroeconomy, while countries with democratic and highquality governmental institutions were better. Among our main indicators, the only one that does not enter with a significant coefficient is ELF60 [ethnic and linguistic fractionalisation in 1960]; it has the right sign, but is insignificant at conventional levels" (Rodrik, 1998, p 27) .
Critical discussion
A closer look at Rodrik's model raises a fundamental conceptual question. Is the rationale of his hypothesis -latent conflicts and weak institutions of conflict resolution lead to "bad policies" -really convincing? Rodrik's preferred way to exemplify the rationale of his hypothesis is a country comparison between South Korea, Turkey, and Brazil (Rodrik 1998 , p 7 ff; Rodrik 1997, p 6 ff). All three countries were hit by external shocks in the 1970s, but the policy reactions were very different. Korea overcame the crisis in short time with an orthodox adjustment programme.
Immediately after the signs of a balance of payments crisis became visible, the authorities allowed for a devaluation of the Won, tightened fiscal and monetary policy, and launched a structural reform programme to improve the efficiency of the economy. After about one year of moderate inflation and recession the country was back on a sustainable growth path.
Turkey responded to the terms of trade losses after 1973/74 with heavy external borrowing, which resulted in an unsustainable debt situation in the 1980s. Although the authorities subsequently corrected some of the macroeconomic imbalances they never fully succeeded in recovering stability. The devaluation of the Turkish Lira was followed by a massive decline of real wages and rural-urban terms of trade, and incomes were transferred away from farmers and workers to the public sector.
According to Rodrik, this legacy of distributional conflicts largely explains the high inflation and economic underperformance of the country since the early 1980s.
In the case of Brazil Rodrik argues that it was mainly the formal wage indexation and other forms of wage-price stickiness that prevented the authorities from implementing an orthodox adjustment programme in the 1980s. Given these rigidities, Rodrik concludes, the costs of adjustment in terms of output losses would have been very high. As a consequence, Brazilian authorities tried fiscal and monetary restraint only half-heartedly. The country went into an accelerating devaluation-inflation spiral and a more or less continuous decline of per capita income, which only ended after 1994
with the Real plan.
Rodrik's comparative story may look convincing at first sight, but at a closer look it is difficult to understand why and how the institutional weaknesses exemplified for three countries, and approximated in his econometric model, should determine the different policy choices. First, it must be noted that the institutional settings in the three countries, as described by indicators used in Rodrik's estimates, hardly support his hypothesis. Table 1 Based on this reasoning the story of the three country examples can be told from the point of view of the openness school of thought, which puts trade policy and its longer-term impact at the centre. When the external shock hit Korea, the country had already developed a competitive industry, which responded to the devaluation of the Won and the structural reforms with substantial output growth. Within short time expenditure switching effects and expansive responses to structural adjustments overcame the temporary output losses resulting from expenditure reduction. Rodrik would be hard pressed to deny that the competitiveness of the industry was a valuable asset in the time of crisis, and a strong incentive for Korean authorities to apply orthodox adjustment prescriptions. And it would be equally hard to deny that the relative openness of the Korean economy since long was a major determinant of that competitiveness. Korea's average nominal tariff was below 14 % throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and only 10 % of its imports were covered by a quota system (Sachs and Warner 1995, p29) .
Neither Brazil nor Turkey were in the comfortable situation of having available an industrial base as competitive as in Korea, and that was arguably the legacy of Table 2 contains the correlation coefficients between the variables. Correlation is high between LNTAR, SWI, and LNYPC1. In the regressions discussed below LNYPC1 was never significant and is therefore not reported. Likewise the non-tariff trade restrictions (QUOTA) has always turned out to be insignificant and was also dropped from the regressions.
The regression results in Table 3 
V Conclusions
It is certainly true that trade policy is only one determinant of openness, and it is certainly true that trade policy alone is not a panacea to overcome economic stagnation or low growth rates. But who ever made that claim? Criticising the conclusion of Rodriguez and Rodrik that proponents of openness have too narrow a focus on dismantling barriers to trade, Baldwin (2003, p 27) states correctly that proponents of the openness school of thought always argue in favour of "policy changes aimed at eliminating large government deficits, curtailing inflationary monetary policies, maintaining market-oriented exchange rates, increasing competition among domestic firms, reducing government corruption, improving the education system, strengthening the legal system and so forth". Trade policy and openness are only two issues on a long reform agenda -that much is clear. The challenge is to find combinations of policies and institutions that fulfil sufficient conditions for sustained economic growth in the medium term.
"Those countries that do things right do most things right, and those countries that do things wrong do most things wrong". (Mankiw 1995, p 304) This statement describes the core problem of testing alternative hypotheses on the determinants of growth. Srinivasan and Bhagwati (2001) , Baldwin (2003) , and the call for country studies is often part and parcel of the conclusions and recommendations for future research of many cross-national studies -the paper at hand being no exception. Such country studies would also allow investigating a possible common root of the policy and institutional weaknesses that often occur simultaneously. Whether we look at policy weaknesses or institutional weaknesses, the common denominator seems to be a political and societal mind-set that neglects the basic principles of a functioning market economy. If that were true, and if these mind-sets could be made operational for empirical tests, chances would increase to solve the puzzle described by the quotation from Mankiw and discussed in more detail before.
with an explicit focus on poverty reduction. Of all the studies mentioned in this paper it is only Dollar and Kraay (2001b) who make the link between openness, growth, and poverty reduction. Of course, it is true that in the very long run poverty is lowest where average incomes are highest. Nonetheless, although Dollar and Kraay fail to identify explicit pro-poor growth-policies (and institutions), their results illustrate that (in the medium term) growth of average incomes and poverty reduction are quite different things. The growth of average incomes explains not more than 50 % of the growth of average incomes of the poorest quintile. Economic growth is not an end in itself, and one of the undisputed final goals is to free people from poverty. The detailed analysis of the impact of openness, policies, and institutions on poverty deserves much more attention than it is currently given. Easterly and Levine (1996) Index of rule of law
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